










































Cyswllt i'r cyhoeddiad / Link to publication
Dyfyniad o'r fersiwn a gyhoeddwyd / Citation for published version (APA):
Hiscock, A. (2018). Debating early modern and modern memory: Cultural forms and effects: a
critical retrospective. Memory Studies, 11(1), 69-84. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017736839
Hawliau Cyffredinol / General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or
other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal
requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private
study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.





Name: Andrew Hiscock 
 
Address (postal 2016-18):  
Institut de Recherche sur la Renaissance, l’Âge Classique et les Lumières (IRCL) 
Université Paul-Valéry, Montpellier III – Site Saint Charles 
Route de Mende  
34199 Montpellier Cedex 5 
France 
 
(email) : a.hiscock@bangor.ac.uk 
 
Affiliation:  School of English Literature, Bangor University, Wales/ Université Paul- 
Valéry, Montpellier III 
 
Article Title: Debating Early Modern and Modern Memory: Cultural Forms and Effects. A 
Critical Retrospective 
 
Preferred Running Head: Memory – a Retrospective 
 
Abstract: This discussion focuses upon the ways in which early modern and modern cultural 
debate examines memory both in terms of its functions and nature as human faculty 
and of its effects as a cultural phenomenon. It seeks to uncover some of the striking 
synergies as well as the contrary motions in the vigorous cultural debates surrounding 
the reflex to remember and its implications for various target audiences. Of particular 
interest will be the ways in which memory was and is pressed into service to forge 
critical narratives of origin and belonging at both a personal and collective level, 
notably with reference to Shakespeare’s History plays. Discussion ranges across a 
number of early modern textual genres (e.g. correspondence; drama; epic poetry; 
historiography; devotional writing) to probe the prevailing cultural expectations 
surrounding the exercise of recollection and the consequences of the failure to perform 
such duties. 
 
Keywords: historiography; humanism; monument; pedagogy; Reformation; Shakespeare. 
 
Article word count: 8210 
 
Brief Biography: Andrew Hiscock is Professor of English Literature at Bangor University, 
Wales and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the Institut de 
Recherche sur la Renaissance, l’Âge Classique et les Lumières (IRCL), 
Université Paul-Valéry, Montpellier III. He is a Fellow of the English 
Association, editor (English & American Lit.) for MLR and series editor of The 
Yearbook of English Studies. He is series co-editor of the Arden Early Modern Drama 
Guides. He has published widely on early modern English and French literature 




Debating Early Modern and Modern Memory:  





Of all faculties in man, Memory is the weakest, first waxeth olde, and decayes sooner then 
Strength or Beautie […] now as generally in all things we are forgetfull, so in nothing more 
then in things belonging to our woes: Either we dare not, or cannot, remember miseries 
which must befall us. (King, 1992: 69) 
 
In this sermon dating from 1621, Henry King, bishop of Chichester and poet, voiced a complaint 
familiar to successive generations of early modern readers and audiences, that the failing 
operations of the faculty for recollection bore ample evidence of the remorseless human decline 
from a pristine state of spiritual integrity. The implications of such deterioration upon both body 
and soul were here being deciphered in some detail for the assembled company at St. Paul’s 
Cross in the closing years of James VI/I’s reign, but even a cursory encounter with early modern 
print or manuscript culture soon reveals that the strenuous flexing of the well-tempered memory 
continued to be promoted as a strategic resource in the Age’s ethical and political armoury for 
government and, indeed, self-government. The Puritan divine Paul Baynes, for example, 
thundered, ‘What makes men sweare, bowze, give place to their lusts, goe on in hardnesse of 
heart?’ – and, not pausing for response, asserted without expectation of demur, ‘it is forgetting 
themselves, and never once considering what they doe, and how they goe on’ (Baynes, 1618: 15-
6). At such junctures we may be reminded of Paul Ricoeur’s contention in more recent times 
that ‘In remembering something (se souvenant de quelque chose), one remembers oneself (on se 
souvient de soi)’ (Ricoeur, 2004: 96). 
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This discussion seeks to uncover some of the striking synergies as well as the contrary 
motions in the vigorous cultural debates surrounding the faculty of memory in both the early 
modern and modern periods. It ranges across many different genres, querying the status and 
function of the faculty in Elizabethan and Jacobean print culture and in Shakespeare’s History 
plays – those extended meditations on the political power of remembering. Indeed, of particular 
interest in this enquiry will be the ways in which memory was and is pressed into service to forge 
critical narratives of origin and belonging at both a personal and collective level. As a sequence 
of recent early modern studies has indicated (e.g. Engel, 1995; Hiscock, 2011; Karremann, 2015; 
Pivetti, 2015; Lyne, 2016; Engel, Loughnane and Williams, 2016), the narrative drive in 
successive early modern texts  sought to render human experience legible in terms of recovery 
and retrieval, embedding the faculty to remember in a range of widely available and established 
intellectual discourses of enquiry – Platonic, Aristotelian, rhetorical, anatomical, architectural, 
historiographical, chorographical, and scientific.. Indeed, as Raphael Lyne has recently 
contended, such discourses continually negotiate authority over the faculty: ‘The science of 
memory has great explanatory power in certain contexts and on certain terms, but it does not 
have a monopoly on that power’ (Lyne, 2016: 2). In each of these discursive contexts, early 
modern readers and audiences were urged, as Baynes demonstrates above, to attend to the very 
disciplinary nature of memory: not only the ways that  changing conceptualisations had penetrated 
ancient and medieval curricula becoming organising principles for subsequent humanist debates 
concerning pedagogy, but also the ways in which early modern textual cultures were often 
powerfully exercised by the possibility that theatre-goers, church-goers, gamesters, itinerants, 
merchants, and even kin, amongst many others, might succumb to all kinds of amnesia and 
‘forget’ themselves. Indeed, in Of the knowledge and conducte of warres (1578) Thomas Proctor 
argued that roving agents such as soldiers, ‘beinge in daylie daungers of deathe’, should 
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nevertheless remain mindful that, ‘it is seldome or neuer seene the dissolute person to prooue a 
profitable souldier […] such bee more meete for an Alehouse then an army. Wherefore good 
souldier, take thy beginninge of God, Remember first and chyefelie to dyscharge thy duetye 
towardes him’ (Proctor, 1578: 18v). Similarly, the knightly protagonist of Book II of Spenser’s 
The Faerie Queene cautions his errant retainer: 
 
Vnlucky Squire (said Guyon) sith thou hast  
Falne into mischiefe through intemperaunce,  
Henceforth take heede of that thou now hast past,  
And guyde thy waies with warie gouernaunce,  
Least worse betide thee by some later chaunce.  
But read how art thou nam’d and of what kin.   (Spenser, 1590: 242 (II.iv.36)) 
 
More generally, throughout this magnum opus, it soon becomes apparent that Spenser’s figures, 
(in Book II, the knightly questers Guyon and Arthur) can only secure an accurate knowledge of 
who they are and the forward trajectory of their lives by picking over the remains of the past. 
Within the confines of Alma’s (or anima’s) castle, Arthur (still lacking a kingdom) and Guyon 
(beset with tribulations and insufficient knowledge) are presented as studying arduously the dust-
ridden contents of the library in the company of Eumnestes (good memory) and Anamnestes 
(recollection) (The Faerie Queene, II.ix). In fashioning such tales of chivalric and spiritual labours 
for Elizabethan consumption, Spenser was renewing the narrative arc of epics inherited from 
antiquity: in Book I of Virgil’s Aeneid, for example, shipwrecked on the shores of Libya, the 
Trojan prince rallies his men with the passionate appeal: ‘The day will come, perhaps, when it 
will give you pleasure to remember even this.’ (Virgil, 1990: 9 (I.203)). However, equally 
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importantly, Spenser was also engaging vigorously with paradigms established in the works of 
nearer contemporaries, Italian epic writers such as Boiardo, Ariosto and Tasso. Profoundly 
influenced by Ariostan narrative techniques of entrelacement, Spenser’s undertaking was equally 
shaped by the relentless questing for self-completion which characterises the travails of Ruggiero, 
Bradamante, Isabella and the protagonist himself in Orlando furioso (1st pub. 1516). Later, in 
Tasso’s Gerusalemme Liberata (1st pub. 1581) the intrepid Rinaldo is discovered declaring to his 
mistress: 
 
Your deare remembrance will I keepe in minde, 
In ioes, in woes, in comforts, hopes and feares, 
Call me your souldiour and your knight, as farre 
As Christian faith permits, and Asias warre. (Tasso, 1600: 291) 
 
The abiding investments of early modern formulations of memory in narratives of heroism also 
engage closely with the Ciceronian belief that the retelling of exceptional human experience in 
historical narrative offered the opportunity for the renewal of past models of virtue in that it 
‘bears witness to the passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives life to recollection, and 
guidance to human existence, and brings tidings of ancient days’ (Cicero, 1942: 225). 
Centuries earlier, Aristotle had famously affirmed in De Memoria et Reminiscentia that the 
human ability to remember, amongst other acts of cognition, was articulated with a visual lexis– 
‘Without an image thinking is impossible’ (Aristotle, 1984: 714). Such contentions clearly had a 
profound influence upon succeeding generations of readers from all spectrums of belief. Indeed, 
richly sensitive to the manifold temptations on offer to a sinning populace in seventeenth-century 
London at the beginning of the period of Charles I’s ‘Personal Rule’, the Puritan lawyer and 
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vitriolic author William Prynne not only railed in Histrio-mastix The players scourge, or, actors 
tragaedie (1633) against the activities of the playhouses located in the suspect, seemingly labourless 
‘liberties’ of the city but chose precisely to strike an  Aristotelian note by reminding his audience, 
‘Nothing more powerfully sinkes into the memory, then that which is apprehended by the eye’ 
(Prynne, 1633: 93, 357). 
 Elsewhere during these early decades of the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon was also 
considering how play-making might impress itself upon the mind – but from a rather different 
perspective to that of Prynne. He argued in the sixth book of De Augmentis (1623) that dramatic 
representation might indeed be beneficial in stimulating the powers of recall: ‘stage-playing [...] 
strengthens the memory, regulates the tone and effect of the voice [...] gives not a little assurance, 
and accustoms men to bear being looked at’ (Bacon, 1857-74: IV.496). Here, Bacon sought to 
transform the cultural construct of the memory theatre for contemporaneous scrutiny. However, 
acutely aware of the intellectual deficiencies of his age, Bacon was always able to exercise the 
minds of his many and various audiences with the very multifariousness of his counsel. In a letter 
to Sir Henry Savile dating from the final years of Elizabeth’s reign, for example, he (like earlier 
humanist scholars, such as Erasmus in De ratione studii (1511) and Vives in De Tradendis Disciplinis 
(1531)) recognized that in certain circumstances the faculty of memory might require vigorous 
training, and advised, ‘if want of memory grow through lightness of wit and want to stayed 
attention, then the mathematics or the law helpeth; because they are things wherein if the mind 
once roam it cannot recover’ (Bacon, 1857-74: VII.102). Thus, in many different contexts, this 
symbolic practice of remembering returned to the question of governance in the early modern 
period – to the ethical undertaking of, and ever-present potential for waywardness in, the body 




Memory, Self and Soul 
As Frances Yates, Mary Carruthers and Janet Coleman have demonstrated, whether in the 
ancient, medieval, early modern or modern periods, textual cultures have often compelled their 
audiences to revisit and re-interrogate the faculty of memory to secure a finer-grained, enhanced 
understanding of the nature of human subjectivity (Yates, 1966; Carruthers, 1990; Coleman, 
1992). Famously in the Confessions, Augustine had promoted memory as a key axis along which 
to plot the formation of selfhood, declaring, ‘It is I who remember, I who am mind […] Indeed 
the power of memory is something I do not understand when without it I cannot speak about 
myself’ (Augustine, 1991: 193 (X.xvi.25)). In the medieval and early modern periods, this 
Augustinian emphasis continued to wield a potent influence not only upon intellectual debate, 
but upon the age’s very understandings of epistemology and ontology, as exemplified in William 
Fulwood’s translation of Guglielmo Gratarolo’s The castel of memorie (1562), ‘take Memorye away: 
What is a man? What can he doe?/or els what can he say?’ (Gratarolo, 1562: A5v). Without the 
resources of recollection, the existential integrity of the speaking voice disappears and our 
everyday selves become splintered, fragmented, deprived of their essential unity. Many 
generations later, in the inter-war years of the twentieth century, R. G. Collingwood argued in 
his Speculum Mentis, or the Map of Knowledge (1924) that ‘A mind which knows its own change is 
by that very knowledge lifted above change. History, and the same is true of memory [...], is the 
mind’s triumph over time’ (Collingwood, 1924: 301). However, by the late twentieth century, 
cultural theorists such as Richard Terdiman turned to a much less sanguine notion of memory, 
contending that it cannot be effortlessly integrated into either an Augustinian discourse of 




Most often we think of memory as a faculty constituting our consciousness and our self-
awareness, as the means by which our coherence and our history is constructed and 
sustained. Such mnemonic activity is fundamental. But there is another side to memory 
– memory as a problem, as a site and source of cultural disquiet. (Terdiman, 1993: vii) 
 
There remains ample evidence that some early modern minds at least were also acutely aware 
that memory might constitute ‘a site and source of cultural disquiet’. Following in the footsteps 
of John Leland, early modern antiquarians sought ambitiously to uncover the truths of the 
evolving narrative of the nation (often identified in topographies and surviving relics and 
monuments), while simultaneously recognizing the culture of refutation and querying the 
nation’s claims of origination (see Parry, 1995; Vine, 2010). In Britannia (1st pub. 1586; 1st pub. 
trans. in English by Philemon Holland,  1610) William Camden acknowledged that, in revisiting 
and relating the histories of such men as ‘Geffray of Monmouth’, he used sources ‘held suspected 
amongst the iudicious’. The incremental aggregation of data into a grand narrative of the nation 
could not  allay growing fears for Camden that the textual resources which had survived might 
be flawed, so a range of different pasts might be competing for position in successive 
constructions of ‘Britannia’. Thus, a chastened chorographer addresses the reader, ‘Who 
shooting all day long doth alwaies hit the marke? Many matters in these studies are raked under 
deceitfull ashes. There may be some escapes from memorie, for who doth so comprehend 
particularities, in the treasury of memory, that he can utter them at his pleasure?’ (Camden, 
1610: *7).  
 By the Jacobean period, as Dean of St. Paul’s, John Donne (never a writer to overlook a 
potential source of disquiet, spiritual or otherwise) argued at length in his sermons that if the 
faculty of memory might operate as an initial stimulus to self-knowledge and piety, yet, on other 
9 
 
occasions, it might also impoverish spiritually and betray the unwary Christian. In his preaching, 
Donne often revealed himself keenly aware of the dual imperatives of Wisdom 11.12 (‘For a 
double grief came upon them, and a groaning for the remembrance of things past’) and of the 
plaintive submission familiar from the Seven Penitential Psalms: ‘Remember, not O Lord our or 
our parents’ offences: neither take vengeance of our sins’. Thus, Donne reminded his 
congregation, ‘in this survey of sin, thy first care must be, to take heed of returning too diligently 
to a remembrance of those delightful sins which are past; for that will endanger anew’ (Donne, 
1953-62: I.3.194).1  
All the proliferating perspectives on memory in these years were enriched by the 
production and translation of Michel de Montaigne’s Essais. Fully conversant with memorial 
debates inherited from antiquity, the French essayist provocatively submitted that ‘it is 
commonly seene by experience, that excellent memories do rather accompanie weake 
judgements’ (Montaigne, 1613: 15 (I.ix)). Thus, despite the evidence of this voluminous 
collection of meditations regaling the reader with his own memorial prowess, Montaigne artfully 
drew attention to the perceivedly symbiotic, but desperately conflicted relationship that might 
exist between acts of recollection and cognition: ‘‘For memorie representeth vnto vs, not what 
we chuse, but what pleaseth her’ (Montaigne, 1613: 276 (II.xii)). Montaigne well understood that 
one of the most significant ways in which the intellect was invited to invest in memoria in early 
modern culture was through the renewed commitment to historia. Indeed, across the Channel in 
post-Reformation England, the widespread commitment to the reading, writing, translation of 
and commentary on scripture and Greco-Latin texts constituted a significant, recurring response 
to an acutely felt cultural void – a response to a profound, but lately silenced, desire to venerate. 
This desire had hitherto been reserved for seemingly ageless relics, sacred spaces and the precious 
rituals of Catholic Christendom. However, how might the well-practised power of recollection 
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continue to be admired, when that which was in living memory was tainted by the ‘old faith’? 
The enormous claims of Catholic Christendom upon all areas of intellectual life in the medieval 
West had meant that remembering became a conspicuous feature of all kinds of acts of piety: 
preaching; collective prayer; pilgrimage; personal devotion; the commemoration of the dead; the 
veneration of saints; the sacrament of confession; monastic practices and writings which focused 
precisely upon the enhancement of spiritual interiority.2 Subsequent early modern centuries 
remained richly sensitive to these emphases. Indeed, in one of his customary attacks upon Stoical 
thinking, Erasmus paid particular attention to the travails of mind and body, enquiring in his 
De Contemptu Mundi (1521),  
 
Has anyone ever weighed up the terror of a seething heart, the violent uprising that rends 
the heart, the factions that pull it this way and that, shaking it up, plucking and tearing 
it apart? Memory serves as its prosecutor, the mind sits as its judge, and conscience plays 
the executor. Reason beckons this way, nature another, the desire to sin a third. Hence a 
continual goading on, a continual struggling and battling. (Erasmus, 1988: 163). 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the longevity of such practices of Catholic devotion, successive generations 
of Reformists remained alert to the accusation that they were committing themselves to a new-
found form of worship with no deeper roots that those of an inauthentic present. In sixteenth-
century Europe, faith communities remained sensitive to this damning charge of novelty which 
might be made by adversaries against any assertion of authority. Calvin himself reputedly 
enquired, ‘Who will venture to place the authority of Copernicus above that of the Holy Spirit?’ 
(Stimson, 1917: 46-47); and, across the religious divide of Europe in Catholic Spain, Claudio 
Aquaviva  urged his fellow Jesuits, ‘Let us try, even when there is nothing to fear for faith and 
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piety, to avoid having anyone suspect us of wanting to create something new or teaching a new 
doctrine [...] Let no one adopt new opinions in the questions already treated by other authors’ 
(Ariew, 2012: 40). This certainly contextualises Hythloday’s sardonic observation in More’s 
Utopia that scholars would consider it  
 
‘[...] a very dangerous matter if a man were found to be wiser in any point than his 
forefathers were. As a matter of fact, we quietly neglect the best examples they have left 
us; but if something better is proposed, we seize the excuse of reverence for times past 
and cling to it desperately. Such proud, obstinate, ridiculous judgments I have 
encountered many times, and once even in England.’ 
 ‘What!’ I asked. ‘Were you ever in England?’ (More, 1992: I.8-9)  
 
A century after Utopia, figures like Bacon might be found affirming the crucial significance of 
innovation, introduction, experimentation in what he termed the ‘proficience’ of the human 
condition. He argued in treatise after treatise that the (early) modern age was not condemned to 
revive and repeat the flawed actions and knowledges of the past: as the human intellect embraced 
new interpretative possibilities of its material existence, in turn new, more fruitful trajectories 
from the past might be envisaged. Others, however, were more interested in renewal and 
renovation than innovation. Nearly a century earlier, Erasmus asserted that ‘to restore great 
things is sometimes not only a harder but a nobler task than to have introduced them’ (Erasmus, 
1976: 221–2).  
During Elizabeth’s reign, in his own painstaking engagement with the labours of earlier 
historians, John Foxe was determined to throw back upon Catholics the familiar complaint 
levelled at Reformers that they had no history, no memory, no past in which to anchor their 
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cultures of worship. In retaliation, Foxe demanded imperiously at the opening of the Acts and 
Monuments, ‘I aske here of this Romaine clergie, where was this church of theirs which nowe is, 
in the old auncient time of þe primitiue church of Rome, with this pompe & pride, wt this riches 
& superfluitie, with this gloria mundi [?]’ (Foxe, 1570: 28). Understandably, in an age which 
customarily drew sustenance for all its organising principles of authority, legitimacy and 
difference, indeed the very notion of human dignitas itself, from its relations with the past, the 
cultural drive of each faith community was to commemorate and to resist the onset of change in 
its self-conceptualisation. 
 
Shakespeare and the Production of Memory 
Michel de Certeau contended that ‘History is probably our myth. It combines what can be 
thought, the “thinkable”, and the origin, in conformity with the way in which a society can 
understand its own working’ (Certeau, 1988: 21). This indomitable fascination with forging, 
strengthening, consolidating relations with the past as part of a larger process of social enquiry 
clearly manifested itself not only in the burgeoning production of chronicles, martyrologies, 
chronographies, classical translations and biographies in the early modern period, it was also 
witnessed in the development of a national history for theatrical consumption. A vigorous 
investment in retrieving (and producing) memorial narratives is one shared by characters and 
audiences alike (on- and off-stage) in Shakespeare’s (and his collaborators’) History plays  where 
competing narrative recessions are accompanied by a keen and growing realisation of the 
penetrating experiences of lack, loss and absence in the present.  
The production of these Histories in the 1590s represented a key contribution to the 
unending debates in late Elizabethan England concerning, amongst other questions, the 
ambitions and implications of militarised society. Indeed, as they endure the urgent dual threats 
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of moral and political collapse in their societies, the inhabitants of these plays (and their 
audiences) are called upon to probe the bitterly competitive nature of remembering – the ways 
in which we choose to re-encounter and valorise the conflicts of the past for political gain. Kyle 
Pivetti has recently returned attention to the strategic (and potentially therapeutic) deployment 
of memory arts in the period wherein ‘violence […] ensures retention. […] By imagining an act of 
destruction upon those one values (or despises), he or she can protect his or her own memory 
from failure. The memory image takes advantage of the speaker’s fear, using his or her reactions 
to vivid violence in service of a mnemonic strategy. The most effective memory image will be that 
which imagines calamity, repeating destruction in service of another rhetorical goal’ (Pivetti, 
2015: 45). The specifically monitory value of spectacular violence and misfortune is 
communicated in the remorseless theatre of bloodletting which characterises the early Histories. 
Strategically, the scaffolding of the Henry VI plays is both reliant upon and dismantled by ‘That 
ever living man of memory,/Henry the Fifth’ (Shakespeare, 1990: 151 (1 Henry VI – IV.iii.51-
2)).3 However, in the aftermath of great King Harry’s passing, the English nation is wracked by 
the trauma of bitter division and collapsing narratives of collective belonging and achievement.  
In Time and Narrative Paul Ricoeur argued that ‘time becomes human time to the extent 
that it is organised after the manner of a narrative’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 3), and in the Henry VI plays 
the endlessly renewing narratio of an absent patriarch spawns a seemingly endless succession of 
morally unremarkable countercultures, characterised principally by their faithlessness and 
stunted vocabulary of brutality. Nonetheless, recollections of Henry V’s sovereignty are soon 
forced to struggle for their place against earlier, medieval precedents for the exercise of power: at 
Rouen, Talbot’s thoughts are monopolised by the memory that ‘in this late-betrayed town/Great 
Coeur-de-lion's heart was buried’ (Shakespeare, 1990: 131 (1 Henry VI – III.ii.82-3)), whereas in 
3 Henry VI, Oxford is prompted to remind his auditors of ‘great John of Gaunt,/Which did 
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subdue the greatest part of Spain’ (Shakespeare, 1999: 144 (III.iii.81-2)). Clearly, the late 
Elizabethan playhouses remained alive to the empowering synergies, the creative possibilities, 
which were excited when memoria was placed in close proximity to narratio. As often appreciated, 
early modern educationalists pondered the value of the ars memoriae inherited from writers such 
as Quintilian, Cicero and from the Rhetorica ad Herennium: in such discussions, the public 
speaker might retrieve significant information as his powers of concentration travelled 
imaginatively through mental images of complex edifices or arresting scenes, visiting each 
remembered locus in turn. In the Institutio Oratoria, for example, Quintilian advises that ‘Some 
place is chosen […] such as a spacious house divided into a number of rooms [...] The first thought 
is placed, as it were, in the forecourt; the second, let us say, in the living room; the remainder are 
placed in due order [...] as soon as the memory of the facts requires to be revived, all these places 
are visited in turn and the various deposits are demanded from their custodians’ (Quintilian, 
1936: 213, 221, 223 (IV.xi.2.1, IV.xi.18, IV.xi.20–1)). Raphael Lyne has highlighted recently that 
the ‘medieval memory arts aimed to assuage the effects of human frailty, whereas Renaissance 
exponents sought to harness the power of the human mind, and to equip it to apprehend the 
whole world’ (Lyne, 2016: 4). In contrast, Shakespeare’s history plays transport us to a benighted 
netherworld, remote and unmoved by the Renaissance veneration for the ‘piece of work’ that is 
‘man’.  
In this context, Ricoeur has queried whether ‘historiography in a certain way [is not] the 
heir of the ars memoriae, that artificial memory [...] a way of expressing memorization turned into 
an exploit?’ (Ricoeur, 2004: 141-2). The History plays probe precisely this relationship between 
recollection, exploit and collective belonging. 1 Henry VI, for example, opens at an irrevocable 
moment of cultural parturition in the wake of Henry V’s death: Bedford proclaims, ‘Hung be 
the heavens with black! Yield day to night!’ (Shakespeare, 1990: 66 (I.i.1)). By the opening of 2 
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Henry VI, the union of the failed state with Margaret of Anjou is not signalled as a moment for 
national celebration at the English court. Indeed, the regent Gloucester holds the alliance to be 
a prelude to chaos, occasioned by the ills of collective amnesia: ‘O peers of England, shameful is 
this league,/Fatal this marriage, cancelling your fame,/Blotting your names from books of 
memory,/[...] Undoing all, as all had never been!’ (Shakespeare, 1991: 84 (I.i.95-7, 100)). 
 The history plays, indeed, strikingly endorse Freud’s contention that ‘There is in general 
no guarantee of the data produced by our memory’ (Freud, 1953-74: 3:315), producing narratives 
which have succumbed to the operations of excision, supplement and unexpected tempi – all 
practices with which the faculty of memory itself is intimately acquainted. As dramatic characters 
scavenge amongst narratives of former experience for traces of possible claims to authority and 
as their lives on the early modern stage are unhistorically stretched, edited or curtailed in these 
accounts of the vicissitudes of fifteenth-century England, audiences are compelled to examine at 
close quarters their own appetites for renewed knowledge of origination and legitimation to be 
derived from the remains of the past.  
In his landmark study La Mémoire collective (1950), Maurice Halbwachs stressed for the 
mid-twentieth century that ‘Society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in 
thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete 
them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige 
that reality did not possess’ (Halbwachs, 1992: 51). The dramaturgy of these History plays 
impresses upon us in a host of different ways that our memories are irrepressibly creative – 
perhaps because they need to be. In a reality where the human mind only ever has insufficient 





Memory and Political Narrativisation 
Earlier in his discussion, Halbwachs urged his readers to be mindful of the strategic role of 
memory in the formulation of a collective consciousness: ‘in order to remember, one must be 
capable of reasoning and comparing and of feeling in contact with a human society that can 
guarantee the integrity of our memory’ (Halbwachs, 1992: 41). When we take our leave from the 
communal undertakings of remembering, like Shakespeare’s Hamlet, for example, Halbwachs 
affirms that we seek out through the exercise of memory another form of community: 
 
In a way, contemplative memory or dreamlike memory helps us to escape society. […] Yet, 
if we flee in this way from the society of the people of today, this is in order to find 
ourselves among other human beings and in another human milieu, since our past in 
inhabited by the figures of those we used to know. In this sense, one can escape from a 
society only by opposing to it another society [...] (Halbwachs, 1992: 47) 
 
As we have seen, William Camden constantly reviewed the textual bloodlines for nation-building 
he had inherited. In direct comparison, a generation earlier, Foxe had repeatedly bewailed the 
threadbare nature of some of his sources for the Acts and Monuments (‘Would to God that the 
constant diligence of our predicessours had preserued in memory for vs the whole order of their 
life’ (Foxe, 1563: 137).Ralegh in the opening years of James VI/I’s reign remained equally tested 
when seeking to uncover indisputable truths from the circuitous temporum, or cyclical course of 
time, for his History of the World (1614), despairing of humanity ever being able to draw fruit from 
the faulty workings of memory: ‘so we neither looke behinde vs what hath beene, nor before vs 
what shall be’ (‘The Preface’, in Ralegh 1634: B2v). Nonetheless, generation after generation, 
early modern writers and readers sought out the guidance of historical precedent. The desire to 
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decipher the present through a knowledge of antiquity, most especially its theatres of war and 
political strife, continued throughout the early modern period to be catered for by the printing 
presses. Alexander Barclay’s translation of Sallust’s famous cronycle of the warre appeared in 1522, 
for example, and was followed in 1544 by Anthony Cope’s historie of two noble capitaines of the 
worlde, Anniball and Scipio [...] out of Titus Liuius, as well as numerous notable examples of the 
genre in the second half of the century. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Sir Clement 
Edmondes, ‘remembrancer of the Citie of London’, published Obseruations vpon the fiue first 
bookes of Caesars commentaries setting fourth the practise of the art military [...] for the better direction of 
our moderne warres (1601); such translations circulated alongside the Latin editions of writers such 
as Caesar and Tacitus which were being taken up in classrooms and libraries across Europe. 
Indeed, in a prefatory letter at the opening of Holinshed’s Second volume of Chronicles: Conteining 
the description, conquest, inhabitation, and troblesome estate of Ireland (1586), John Hooker asserted 
that his contemporaries might unhesitatingly follow in the steps of their classical forebears for 
‘Iulius Caesar also in his wars searched the ancient bookes and histories of the citie of Rome’ in 
order to ‘draw a paterne for his owne direction, both for his ciuill and his martiall affaires’ (1586: 
A2v).  
 Ralegh is a notable example of a scholar who did not restrict the exercise of memory to 
his incursions into print culture. During the 1580s when he was funding voyages to establish 
colonies in Virginia, he was also recruiting settlers to populate lands in the counties of Cork and 
Waterford in the wake of the devastation brought on by the quashing of the 1583 Desmond 
Rebellion. In 1587, Ralegh was finally in receipt of a grant of some 42,000 acres of land in the 
Munster plantation; and in 1589 he sought refuge there, having fallen foul of the Crown’s 
displeasure. This was an experience he would encounter again in the early 1590s when news of 
his secret marriage to the lady-in-waiting, Elizabeth Throckmorton, became public knowledge, 
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and the disobedient couple retreated to on his Dorset estate of Sherborne. From this retreat, this 
errant knight now had the leisure to examine the travails past and present of the Crown’s 
dealings with its subjects. Regarding the latest ‘Irish combination’ in 1593, for example, Ralegh 
wrote imperiously to Robert Cecil on 10th May: ‘Her Majesty hath good cause to remember that 
a million hath been spent in Irland not many yeares since. A better kingdome would have bynn 
purchased att a less prize and that same defended with as many pence if good order had bynn 
taken’ (Ralegh, 1999: 93-4). Some three years later, in A View of the Present State of Ireland (1596) 
Spenser would advocate the dissolution of the Irish septs and the enforcement of individual 
surnames upon the inhabitants. This, it was argued, would lead to a decay in collective loyalties 
and compel the Irishman [sic] ‘in short time [to] learn quite to forget his Irish nation’ (Spenser, 
1970: 156). If, in the nineteenth century, Emerson insisted that memory was ‘a primary and 
fundamental faculty, without which none other can work; the cement, the bitumen, the matrix 
in which the other faculties are imbedded’ (Emerson, 1899: 63), it appears that an increasing 
number of voices were clearly being heard in Elizabethan England, advocating the dissolution of 
this ‘cement’, this ‘bitumen’, amongst those it wished to colonise for their nation’s (and one may 
believe, their own) greater political ascendancy and economic prosperity.  
 
The Discipline of Memory  
Early modern debates surrounding memory were customarily shaped by expectation of moral 
and/or pious action. This commitment had been bequeathed by earlier generations of 
intellectuals who not only deployed memory as a resource for ethical education, spiritual 
improvement and public service, but who also sought to evaluate the most sympathetic 
conditions in which it might thrive (see Hiscock, 2011: 15ff). Juan Luis Vives, a frequent visitor 
to Henry VIII’s England, highlighted, for example, that ‘What we want to remember must be 
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impressed on our memory while others are silent; but we need not be silent ourselves, for those 
things which we have read aloud are often more deeply retained. In the same way we remember 
better what we have heard from others than what we have read ourselves’ (Vives, 1913: 109).  
In De Inventione Cicero had notably placed memoria as a subdivision of Prudentia and his 
taxonomy continued to have enormous influence in succeeding centuries not only in the writings 
of Augustine (who, in the Confessions, argued that memory became the venter animi or ‘the 
stomach of the mind’ – 10.14.21), but also in the writings of pre-eminent medieval thinkers such 
as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who both executed commentaries of Aristotle’s De 
Memoria et Reminiscentia. In De Bono Albertus promoted memory at the heart of the Christian’s 
moral life: ‘Prudence is the knowledge of the good and evil of actions; this knowledge, moreover, 
is greatly aided by events that have already happened, because by means of the past it will know 
in what way it should manage itself in the future; therefore memory should be part of prudence’ 
(Carruthers, 1990: 268. See also Coleman, 1992: 62ff). Aquinas in his own commentaries upon 
Aristotle’s De Memoria et Reminiscentia emphasised that ‘The role of prudence is to direct the 
prudent man to do what ought to be done by considering not only the present but also the past. 
This is why Cicero sets down as the parts of prudence not only foresight […] but also 
understanding […] and memory’ (Aquinas, 2005: 184). If Peter Burke has argued that 
‘Remembering the past and writing about it no longer seem the innocent activities they were 
once taken to be. Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer’ (Burke 1989: 98)4, 
there is ample evidence in the early modern period that to remember all too often constituted 
an undertaking of religious and/or political engagement. Following precepts set down in the social 
theorising since antiquity, at the close of the Jacobean period the French (Huguenot?) émigré 
Caleb Dalechamp envisaged a community of public servants offering up their talents to the polis. 
He affirmed in his Artis poeticae et versificatoriae encomium (1624) that ‘Memory is not only 
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conducive to learning but also brings no small assistance to our civil life’ (Dalechamp, 1999: 168-
7).5 Clearly, superlative moral (and memorial) exempla might not only be discovered by early 
modern readers in contemporaneous editions of antique history and Scripture, but also in Foxe’s 
martyrologies, Bacon’s meditations on natural philosophy, Ralegh’s ruminative writings or the 
tours de force offered by the memory experts who inhabited the playhouse stage or the pulpit. A 
popular collection such as A Helpe to memory and discourse with table- talke as musicke to a banquet 
of wine (1st pub. 1619, attributed to William Basse)6 indicates that the performative spaces for 
memory (and, interestingly, prophecy) were legion and might be encountered at any point in the 
everyday lives of early modern England: 
 
And now of late yeeres was there a woman, one Mistresse Iostlin of Cambridgeshire, who 
for excellency of memory deserues here to be remembred, who by vse and moderate 
preseruation thereof, was so strong and quicke, that vpon the first rehearsall she was able 
to repeat 40. lines Latine or English, and to carry a whole Sermon from Church, and 
after set it downe almost verbatim in her chamber. She wrote a Legacy to her child before 
it was borne, and prophesied of her owne death, and died accordingly at the time. (Basse, 
1630: 20-1) 
 
Reviewing such questions in the final years of Elizabeth’s reign, Sir William Cornwallis 
contemplated in his own Essayes (1600-1601) the very multifariousness of opportunities open to 
all members of the polity to express evil acts and thoughts and how ‘their resistance is reasons 
office’. Indeed, he argued how we must commit ourselves to, what he termed, a ‘mustering’ of 
‘the good’: ‘The often vsing these thoughts, ends with the practise to a thing often read, the 
memory will lead as well as the eyes, we cannot thinke well often, but we shall do well sometimes, 
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and then vertue is gotten by hart, which before was but counsel’ (Cornwallis, 1600-1601: Q8v). 
Here, as Aristotle had counselled, the faculty of memory is seen to operate symbiotically with 
visual consumption of the world around us to produce strategic acts of cognition.  However, for 
a generation later traversing the divisions created by the civil wars of the 1640s, Sir Thomas 
Browne in Hydriotaphia, or Urne-Buriall (1658) seems to have found modest consolation in the 
knowledge that to be ‘ignorant of evils to come, and forgetfull of evils past, is a mercifull 
provision in nature, whereby we digest the mixture of our few and evil dayes, and our delivered 
senses not relapsing into cutting remembrances, our sorrows are not kept raw by the edge of 
repetitions’ (Browne, 1658: 78). 
 
Concluding Thoughts: Memory and Monument 
Montaigne pleaded in the course of his Essais that ‘Nous ne travaillons qu’à remplir la mémoire, 
et laissons l’entendement et la conscience vuides […] Sçavoir par cœur n’est pas sçavoir; c’est 
tenir ce qu’on a donné en garde à sa mémoire’ (Montaigne, 1878; 103, 119).7 As we witnessed 
at the opening of this discussion, such angles of vision are often intimately connected to the age’s 
ebbing faith in our powers to remember adequately. Bearing witness in Shakespeare’s tragedy 
Othello to his failing powers of apprehension, Cassio submits, ‘I remember a masse of things, but 
nothing distinctly’ (Shakespeare, 2003: 118 (II.iii.264)), and at his first trial in 1603 shortly after 
the accession of James I to the English throne, Ralegh pleaded before his accusers in the court: 
‘Only this, I desire: sickness hath of late weakened me, and my memory was always bad; the 
points in the indictment are many, and in the evidence, perhaps, more will be urged. I beseech 
you, therefore, my Lords, let me answer the points of the evidence severally, as they are delivered; 
for I shall not carry them all in my mind to the end’ (Jardine, 1832: I.402).  
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The endeavours to ‘memorialise’ others by means of textual monuments are widely in 
evidence throughout the early modern period. We might look to the Mary Sidney’s overseeing 
of the editing of her brother Philip’s literary works after his death, John Foxe’s remorseless 
accounts of the maiming and execution of martyrs, or Thomas Bentley in his 1583 accounts of 
‘matrones conteining seuen seuerall lamps of virginitie, or distinct treatises’. However, in the first Act of 
1 Henry VI Charles, Dauphin of France, indulges in an even more widespread early modern 
activity of memorialisation which continued to orient the spiritual, civic and labouring lives of 
many across the nation: the commemorative practices surrounding architectural 
monumentalisation.8 If Joan la Pucelle proves victorious at the head of the French forces at 
Orleans, Charles pledges: 
 
A statelier pyramis to her I’ll rear 
Than Rhodope’s or Memphis’ ever was: 
In memory of her when she is dead, 
Her ashes, in an urn more precious 
Than the rich-jewel’d of Darius, 
Transported shall be at high festivals 
Before the kings and queens of France.       (Shakespeare, 1990: 96 (I.vi.21-27)) 
 
In this particular dramatic narrative, of course, Joan is not allowed to defeat the English or Time 
in any enduring manner, and she enjoys a lion’s share of the demonisation reserved for England’s 
antagonists in this play. More generally, however, the widespread human endeavours in the early 
modern period to signal a textual, political and/or architectural legacy would meet with scorn in 
the next century under the lens of Sir Thomas Browne. Pondering initially in Hydriotaphia 
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Pythagorean formulations of the survival, or transmigration, of the human spirit, Browne 
expands his discussion to the meditation of re-collection, and the faculty of memory’s fraught 
and failing claims upon the attentions of posterity: 
 
To subsist in lasting Monuments, to live in their productions; to exist in their names, 
and prædicament of Chymera’s, was large satisfaction unto old expectations, and made 
one part of their Elyziums. But all this is nothing in the Metaphysicks of true belief [...] 
We whose generations are ordained in this setting part of time [...] cannot excusably 
decline the consideration of that duration which maketh Pyramids pillars of snow, and 
all that’s past a moment [...] (Browne, 1658: 78-9, 83) 
 
By way of conclusion, it might be added that at the end of the twentieth century Andreas Huyssen 
was heard complaining in his remarkable critical collection Twilight Memories, ‘there is a 
deepening sense of crisis often articulated in the reproach that our culture is terminally ill with 
amnesia’ (Huyssen, 1995: 1). It would seem that early modern intellectuals like Donne, Jonson, 
Ralegh and Mary Sidney were haunted by similar conclusions concerning their age’s ailing 
resources of memory and, if surviving documents from the period are an adequate gauge for such 
discussions, they may indeed have been accurate in their anxieties. In sombre fashion John 
Chamberlain wrote to Dudley Carleton from London on October 13th 1621 
 
The old countesse of Pembroke died here some ten dayes since [...] The parlement is 
adjourned by proclamation from the 14th of November to the 8th of February, which 
beeing counted a kind of dismall day as well in other respects, as for the rising of the 
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earle of Essex, yt is marvaile yt was not remembred. (‘To Sir Dudley Carleton, London, 
October 13 1621’. In Chamberlain, 1939: II.400) 
25 
 
Acknowledgements : I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to 
Kate Hodgkin and to her fellow AHRC research network coordinators, Kate Chedgzoy, 
Elspeth Graham and Ramona Wray, for kindly inviting me to be part of their 
ambitious research enquiry into early modern memory culture. 
 
Endnotes: see below 
 
Bibliography 
Aquinas St T (2005). Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘On Sense and What is Sensed’ and ‘On Memory 
and Recollection’, trans K White qnd EM Macierowski. Washington DC: Catholic 
University of America Press. 
Ariew R (2012). ‘Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez: Theory of Distinctions and 
Principle of Individuation’. In B Hill and H Lagerlund eds (2012). The Philosophy of 
Francisco Suárez. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 38-53. 
Aristotle (1984). The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed J Barnes. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Augustine (1991). Confessions, trans H Chadwick. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Bacon Sir F (1857-74). The Works of Francis Bacon, ed J Spedding, RL Ellis, DD Heath. XIV 
vols. London: Longman. 
Baldo J (2011). Memory in Shakespeare’s Histories: Stages of Forgetting in Early Modern England. 
London: Routledge. 
Basse W (attributed to) (1630 (2nd ed)). A Helpe to memory and discourse with table- talke as musicke 
to a banquet of wine : being a compendium of witty, and vsefull propositions, problemes, and 
sentences extracted from the larger volumes of physicians, philosophers, orators and poets, distilled 
in their assiduous and learned obseruations, and which for method, manner, and referent 
handling may be fitly tearmed, A Second misselany, or helpe to discourse. London: TB for L 
Becket. 1st ed 1619. 
Baynes P (1618). A Caveat for Cold Christians. London: F Kyngston for N Newbery.  
Bolzoni L (2001). The Gallery of Memory. Literary and Iconographic Models in the Age of the Printing 
Press. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Browne Sir T (1658). Hydriotaphia, urne-buriall, or, a discourse of the sepulchrall urnes lately found in 
Norfolk. Together with the garden of Cyrus, or the quincunciall. London: sign of the Gun in 
Ivy Lane for H Brome. 
Burke P (1989). ‘History as Social Memory’, 97-113. In T Butler ed (1989). Memory: History, 
Culture and the Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Camden W (1610). Britain, or A chorographicall description of the most flourishing kingdomes, 
England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the ilands adioyning, our of the depth of antiquitie. 
London: Eliot’s Court Press. 
Carruthers MJ (1990). The Book of Memory: a study of memory in medieval culture. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Chamberlain J (1939). The Letters of John Chamberlain, ed NE McClure, II vols. Philadelphia: 
American Philosophical Society. 
Cicero (1942). De Oratore, Books I & II, trans EW Sutton and H Rackham. London/Cambridge 
MA: William Heinemann/Harvard University Press.  
Coleman J (1992). Ancient and Medieval Memories: studies in the reconstruction of the past. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Collingwood RG (1924). Speculum Mentis, or the Map of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
26 
 
Cornwallis Sir W (1600-1). Essayes. By Sir William Corne-Waleys the younger, Knight. London: S 
Stafford and R Read. 
Crompton R (1599). The mansion of magnanimitie. London: R Field. 
Dalechamp C (1999), Artis poeticae et versificatoriae encomium. In Binns, JW (1999). Latin 
Treatises on Poetry from Renaissance England: Henry Dethick ‘Oration in laudem poeseos’; 
Alberico Gentili ‘Commentatio ad Legem III Codicis de professoribus et medicis’; Caleb 
Dalechamp ‘Artis poeticae et versificatoriae encomium’. Signal Mountain, TE: Summertown. 
De Certeau M (1988). The Writing of History, trans T Conley. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Donne J (1953-62). The Sermons of John Donne, in Ten Volumes, eds GR Potter, EM Simpson. 
Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Duffy E (2005). The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, c.1400-1580. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Emerson RW (1899). The Natural History of the Intellect and Other Papers. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Engel WE (1995). Mapping Mortality: The Persistence of Memory and Melancholy in Early Modern 
England. Amherst MA: University of Massachusetts Press.  
Engel WE, Loughnane R and Williams G eds (2016). The Memory Arts in Renaissance England. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Erasmus (1976). ‘To Leo X’, 1 February 1516. In Erasmus (1976). The Collected Works of 
Erasmus, vol. 3: The Correspondence of Erasmus – letters 298 to 445 (1514–1516), trans 
RAB Mynors and DFS Thomson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Erasmus (1978). De copia and De ratione studii, trans C. R. Thompson. In Collected Works of 
Erasmus, vol. 24. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Erasmus (1988). ‘On Disdaining the World/De Contemptu Mundi, trans E Rummel. In Erasmus 
(1988). Collected Works of Erasmus - Spiritualia: ‘Enchiridion’, ‘De Contemptu Mundi’, ‘De 
Vidua Christiana’, vol. 66, ed JW O’Malley. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Erasmus (1988a). The Correspondence of Erasmus, Letters 1122 to 1251 (1520-1521), trans RAB 
Mynors & DFS Thomson. Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 8. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
Foxe J (1563). Acts and Monuments. London: John Day. 
Foxe J (1570). Acts and Monuments. London:  John Day. 
Foxe J (1583). Acts and Monuments. London:  John Day. 
Freud S (1953-74). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans 
and ed Strachey J, Freud A., Strachey A. and Tyson A. 24 vols. London: Hogarth Press. 
Gratarolo G (1562). The Castel of Memorie […] Made by Gulielmus Gratarolus. London: Rouland 
Hall. 
Guibbory A (1980). ‘John Donne and Memory as “The Art of Salvation”’, Huntington Library 
Quarterly (Autumn, 1980), 43, 4, 261-274. 
Guibbory A (1986). The Map of Time: seventeenth-century English literature and ideas of pattern in 
history. Champaign IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Halbwachs M (1992). On Collective Memory, trans LA Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Hiscock A (2011). Reading Memory in Early Modern Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Holinshed R (1586). The Second Volume of Chronicles: Conteining the description, conquest, 
inhabitation, and troblesome estate of Ireland. London: H Denham. 
27 
 
Huyssen A (1995). Twilight Memories. Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. New York: 
Routledge. 
Ivic C (2017). Shakespeare and National Identity: A Dictionary. London: Bloomsbury. 
Jardine D ed (1832). Criminal Trials, 2 vols. London: Charles Knight. 
Karremann I (2015). The Drama of Memory in Shakespeare’s History Plays. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
King H (1992). The Sermons of Henry King (1592-1669) Bishop of Chichester, ed M Hobbs. 
Rutherford/Madison/Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson UP/Scolar Press. 
Lyne R (2016). Memory and Intertextuality in Renaissance Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
MacKinnon D (2014). Earls Colne’s Early Modern Landscapes. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Mignolo WD (2003). The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality & Colonization. 
Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Montaigne M de (1613). Essays written in French by Michael Lord of Montaigne […] done into 
English, according to the last French edition, by Iohn Florio. London: M. Bradwood for 
Edward Blount & William Barret. 
More Sir T (1992). Utopia, trans RM Adams. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.  
Nietzsche F (1909). The Use and Abuse of History. In Nietzsche F (1909). The Complete Works of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, ed O Levy, trans A Collins. Edinburgh/London: TN Foulis. 
Parry G (1995). The Trophies of Time: English Antiquarians of the Seventeenth Century. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pivetti K (2015). Of Memory and Literary Form: Making the Early Modern Nation. Newark DE: 
University of Delaware Press.  
Proctor T (1578). Of the knowledge and conducte of warres two bookes, latelye wrytten and sett foorth, 
profitable for suche as delight in hystoryes, or martyall affayres, and necessarye for this present 
tyme. London: Richard Tottel. 
Prynne W (1633). Histrio-mastix The players scourge, or, actors tragaedie. London: for Michael 
Sparke.  
Quintilian (1936). The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, trans HE Butler. London/Cambridge, 
MA: William Heinemann/Harvard University Press. 
Ralegh Sir W (1634). The History of the World. London: Walter Burre. 
Ralegh Sir W (1999). The Letters of Sir Walter Ralegh, ed A. Latham and J Youings. Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press. 
Ricoeur P (1983). Temps et récit, t. I. Paris: Le Seuil. 
Ricoeur P (1984). Time and Narrative, vol. I, trans McLaughlin K and Pellauer D. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur P (2004). Memory, History, Forgetting, trans Blamey  K and Pellauer D. 
Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Shakespeare W (1990). The First Part of King Henry VI, ed M Hattaway. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Shakespeare W (1991). The Second Part of King Henry VI, ed M Hattaway. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Shakespeare W (1992). King Henry V, ed A Gurr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shakespeare W (1993). The Third Part of King Henry VI, ed M Hattaway. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Shakespeare W (2003) Othello, ed N Sanders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sherlock P (2008). Monuments and Memory in Early Modern England. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
28 
 
Spenser E (1590). The Faerie Queene disposed into twelue books, fashioning XII. morall vertues. 
London: for William Ponsonbie. 
Spenser E (1970). A View of the Present State of Ireland, ed WL Renwick. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Stimson D (1917). The Gradual Acceptance of the Copernican Theory. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Sutton C (1600). Disce mori. = Learne to die. A religious discourse, moouing euery Christian man to 
enter into a serious remembrance of his ende. London: J Windet for J Wolfe. 
Tasso T (1600). Godfrey of Bulloigne, or The recouerie of Ierusalem. Done into English heroicall verse, 
by Edward Fairefax Gent. London: A Hatfield for I Iaggard and M Lownes. 
Terdiman R (1993). Present Past. Modernity and the Memory Crisis. Ithaca/London: Cornell 
University Press. 
Vine A (2010). In Defiance of Time. Antiquarian Writing in Early Modern England. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Virgil (1990). The Aeneid, trans D West. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Vives JL (1913). Vives: On Education. A Translation of ‘De Tradendis Disciplinis’ of Juan Luis Vives, 
trans and intro by F Watson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Walsham A (2012). The Reformation of the Landscape: Religion, Identity and Memory in Early 
Modern Britain and Ireland. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Willis J (1621). The Art of Memory so far forth as it dependeth vpon places and idea’s Written first in 
Latine, by Iohn Willis Bachelour in Diuinitie: and now published in English by the said author, 
with such alternations thereof as seemed needful. London: W. Jones. 
Wright LB ed (1962). Advice to a Son. Precepts of Lord Burghley, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Francis 
Osborne. New York: Folger Shakespeare Library/Cornell University Press. 




1 In this context, see also: Donne vol 2, 1953-62: esp 72ff; Guibbory, 1980 and 1986; Engel, 
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2 On the memorial culture of the Catholic cultures of worship, see: Lina Bolzoni, 2001: esp 
140ff; Duffy, 2005: esp 327ff.. 
3 For further discussion here on the cultural power of forgetting, see: Baldo, 2011; Karremann, 
2015; Ivic, 2017. 
4 In this context, see also: ‘The past cannot be rendered in a neutral discourse’ (Mignolo, 2003: 
5). 
5 Translated from Latin by JW Binns: ‘Quae non ad eruditionem modo conducit, sed ad 
civilies actiones non modicum adfert adiumentum...’ 
6 In this context, see also the notable contribution of John Willis’s The art of memory (1st pub. in 
English, 1621). 
7 Translations: ‘We labour, and toyle, and plod to fill the memorie, and leave both vnderstanding 
and conscience emptie’ (Montaigne, 1613: 62); ‘“Knowing” something  does not mean knowing 
it by heart; that simply means putting it in the larder of our memory’ (Montaigne, 2003: 171).  
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